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MULTIPLE OFFICE BANKING AND MARKET
EXTENSION MERGERS
WILLIAM A. LovETTt
THOMAS A. DEViNS, JR.:
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in market extension merger law open the
way for a substantial increase in concentration within the commercial
banking sector. The United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc. , and
United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank2 decisions by the
Supreme Court, together with more liberal encouragement of mul-
tibank holding companies by the Federal Reserve Board, make it clear
that multiple office banking3 trends could accelerate. This pro-expan-
sion policy represents a significant shift from earlier responses to mul-
tibank integration efforts such as horizontal mergers4 and bank holding
company diversification.' In the face of long term trends toward in-
creased multioffice banking and concentration,6 this retreat poses an
awkward problem for the Congress and the antimerger authorities.
t Professor of Law, Tulane University, A.B. 1956, Wabash College; LL.B. 1959, New York
University; Ph.D. 1967, Michigan State University.
t B.S. 1968, San Jose State University; J.D. 1973, University of Santa Clara; LL.M. 1978,
Tulane University. Member of California and Louisiana bars.
1. 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
2. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
3. The term "multiple office banking" includes branch banking, chain ownership linkages,
and multibank holding companies. Branching exists when one corporate bank establishes multi-
ple offices or branch banks; multibank holding companies own two or more banks (each of which
may own, in turn, a network of branch offices); and chain ownership linkages involve common
groups of stockholders in a series of bank corporations.
4. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); see notes 61-81 and ac-
companying text infra.
5. See Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1976); notes 82-92 and accom-
panying text infra.
6. See, eg., Gilbert & Longbrake, The Effects of Branching by FinancialInstitutions on Com-
petition, Productive Efficiency and Stability: An Examination of the Evidence, in SUBCOMM. ON
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., COMPENDIUM OF ISSUES RELATING TO BRANCHING By FINANCIAL INSTITU-
TIONS 475, 475-88 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as COMPENDIUM].
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This article reviews these developments, evaluates alternative re-
sponses, and recommends an overhaul of the legal guidelines for regu-
lating the various forms of multibank integration, including branch
banking, chain ownership linkages, and multibank holding companies.
A. Commercial Banking Market Structure
Commercial banking in the United States has experienced a slow,
but significant structural transformation. (See Table 1 below.) In the
year 1900, virtually all banking (98%) was conducted in single office
(unit bank) enterprises.8 A moderate branching and chain movement
began after World War 1; 90% of the banks, however, were still unit
bank operations in 1925.9 This early surge toward multioffice banking
was halted by restrictive branching laws enacted by the states, similar
restrictions for national banks under the McFadden Act of 192710 and
the Banking Act of 1933,11 and the Great Depression.1 2 In retrospect,
the most significant factor affecting the development of banking during
this period may have been the elimination of half the nation's banks
and almost half of its banking offices in the 1930's.13 This structural
realignment set the stage for a gradual post-war transformation.
Table 1
Number of Banks and Branch Offices 14







7. See, e.g., W. LAMB, GROUP BANKING (1961); White, The Evolution of State Policies on
Multiloffice Banking From the 1930's to the Present, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 43.
8. Fischer & Golembe, The Branch Banking Provisions of the McFadden 4ct as Amended-
Their Rationale and Rationality, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 1, 40-41 (especially tables I &
2).
9. Id.
10. Ch. 191, § 7, 44 Stat. 1224 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1976)).
11. Ch. 89, § 23, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c), (d) (1976)).
12. See Fischer & Golembe, supra note 8; White, supra note 7.




Three major integration movements have characterized the last
twenty-five years in American banking. In the first integration move-
ment horizontal mergers were emphasized during the late 1950's and
mid-1960's, and this ultimately brought successful, hard-line enforce-
ment under the Bank Merger Act of 196615 and section 7 of the Clayton
Act.16 In the second integration movement one-bank holding compa-
nies were stressed as a vehicle to achieve conglomerate diversifica-
tion.17 This activity flourished during the "Bull Market" euphoria of
the late 1960's, but was contained within relatively narrow limits by the
Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970.18 The third inte-
gration movement began in the early 1970's and consists chiefly of mar-
ket extension mergers, expansion of multibank holding companies and
relaxed branching laws in some states. Unlike the previous phases of
integration, however, no legislation has been enacted to curb this latest
trend toward concentration. On the contrary, our policy now seems
permissive and encouraging, and unit banking is now much less signifi-
cant. By 1975 only 20% of the bank offices in this country (or 9,111 out
of 44,427) were unit banks, while 5,521 banks with branches had 35,316
offices for an average of nearly seven branches apiece.19
B. Trend Toward Concentration
Even more interesting than this transition from a policy that favors
and protects unit banking is the presence of a fundamental shift in the
political balance among the states.20 For most of this century a major-
ity of the states employed more or less restrictive branching laws:
branching was allowed only within the home county and in some in-
stances within a contiguous county.21 This perpetuated a policy of ac-
commodation by the Congress and tended to ensure a conservative
momentum in favor of decentralized, restricted branching in the coun-
try. Recetit developments, however, have tipped the balance decisively
toward multioffice banking. Now at least thirty-seven of the fifty states,
15. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976)).
16. Ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976)).
17. Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate" Liberalization of the Bank Holding Cora-
pany Act, 60 GEO. L.J. 1225, 1233-36 (1972).
18. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1843, 1849, 1850, 1971-
1978 (1976); 31 U.S.C. §§ 324, 391 (1970)); see Chase, supra note 17, at 1226-27.
19. Fischer & Golembe, supra note 8.
20. See generally CAMBRIDGE RESEARCH INST1TuTE, TRENDS AFFECTING THIE U.S. BANK-
ING SYSTEM, 109, 118-19 (1976).
21. See, e.g., W. L0AB, supra note 7, at 44.
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with nearly 85% of the national population, endorse multioffice bank-
ing in one form or another.22
We may be crossing the threshold of a new and dramatic era in
banking market integration with the possible adoption of a number of
changes that seem revolutionary to many observers, such as elec-
tronic funds transfers, interest on demand deposits and the elimination
of Regulation Q,23 which allows higher interest rates for savings and
loans.24 Hence, the stakes for wise public policy are considerable at
this juncture.25 A failure to act responsibly in the coming years could
lead to excessive and irreversible concentration in the banking
industry.
If not limited skillfully, increased banking concentration could
bring significant adverse consequences for the American economy.
From an economic standpoint, high concentration in regional and local
banking markets tends to be associated with increased costs of credit
for the less sophisticated, less affluent, and less powerful borrowers
(consumers and small business enterprises). High concentration nor-
mally brings somewhat less favorable credit terms, greater service
charges and reduced interest earnings to depositors. Insufficient bank
market competition and restricted choice explain these results. From a
broader perspective that takes into account the political and social ef-
fects, we would suffer disturbing costs as well. Industrial and commer-
cial growth may be restricted by a more closely knit banking
establishment in many states, and disproportionate political influence
could well develop. Diversity of sources for financing could be reduced
materially, especially if inflation continues to weaken the role of in-
dependent equity investments as a source of business capital. Eventu-
ally, the only hope for increased competitive vigor in banking might be
interstate branching (or holding company) networks, but over the long
run this would lead to a much greater concentration of finance capital
in the United States and even more troubling political and social
consequences.26
Unfortunately, the course of legal and regulatory development in
22. See note 120 and accompanying text infra.
23. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.0-.7 (1978).
24. See, e.g., Baker, Banking Competition in the Age of the Computer, 90 BANKING L.J. 193
(1973); Verkuil, Perspectipes on Reform of Financial Institutions, 83 YALE L.J. 1349, 1354-60
(1974).
25. See generally FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND MARKETS 563 (M. Ketchum ed. 1970).




the field of multioffice banking has been parochial. The result has been
an inferior compromise between two opposing policy-making tenden-
cies: (1) excessive protectionism for small, rural banking interests, with
inadequate competitive rivalry in many areas; or (2) excessive concen-
tration with unrestricted branching or multibank holding company ac-
tivities. We suffer an apparent Hobson's choice between the frustration
of desirable scale economies with competitive vitality, and dangerous
and unwarranted increases in banking concentration. A way out of this
dilemma will not be easy, but the need for a rational answer seems
readily demonstrable. This article will develop an alternative struc-
tural solution recommending that more branching and intrastate ri-
valry be allowed, but that restrictions be placed on the merger activity
allowed the larger banking organizations in a given state or metropoli-
tan area.
II. GROWTH TRENDS IN BANKING
A. Concentration
Banking in the United States is characterized by a highly lopsided
distribution of firms.27 (See Table 2 below.) The top fifty firms had
$341 billion or 36.3% of commercial bank deposits at the close of
1977.28 At the head of this list were the ten leading "megabanks,"
which held $171 billion in deposits, or nearly one-fifth of all commer-
cial bank deposits in the United States.29 If foreign deposits are in-
cluded, the ten largest banks held $311 billion in deposits, or nearly
28% of the total.
27. Concentration estimates for the 200 largest (or the top 1.3%) United States banks in 1977
based on printout of Federal Reserve call data, December 31, 1977. For figures on concentration
for the 200 largest (or the top 1.3%) United States banks in 1947, see D. ALHtADEF, MONOPOLY
AND COMPETITION IN BANKING 20 (1954). See also Bus. WEEK, Sept. 15, 1973, at 88, which
shows an increase in the share of assets for the 50 largest banks from 39% to 46% between 1945
and 1972.
28. Federal Reserve call data, December 31, 1977 (compilation by the authors).
29. The 10 leading banks in deposits were (1) BankAmerica (San Francisco) with $37 billion
in deposits; (2) Chase Manhattan (New York) $21 billion; (3) Manufacturers Hanover (New York)
$20 billion; (4) Citicorp (New York) $19 billion; (5) Western Bancorporation (Los Angeles) $16
billion; (6) Chemical (New York) $13 billion; (7) Security Pacific (Los Angeles) $12 billion; (8)
Morgan (New York) $11 billion; (9) Wells Fargo (San Francisco) $11 billion; and (10) Continental
Illinois (Chicago) $10 billion. Furthermore, 94 of the largest 200 banks in eight leading financial
states held 41.8% of commercial bank deposits; the remaining 106 large banks held 14.8%, and the
14,411 (approximate) smaller banks held 43.4%. Federal Reserve call data, December 31, 1977
(compilation by the authors). Compare these figures with those in Bus. WEEK, Apr. 17, 1978, at
74-84.
If Rusiness Week's most recent tabulation of United States commercial bank assets and de-
posits based upon Form 10-K reports to the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) were em-
ployed, the share of large banks is increased substantially. Assets of the top 10 increase from $171
billion to $311 billion for the end of December, 1977. For example, BankAmerica leads with
1979]
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Table 2


























$ 682 59.3 $ 532 56.6
$1,166 100.0 $ 939 100.0
$66.4 billion, followed by Citicorp with $55.6 billion, Chase Manhattan with $43.5 billion, Manu-
facturers Hanover with $29.8 billion, Morgan with $23.8 billion, Chemical with $23.3 billion,
Continental Illinois with $18.75 billion, Western Bancorporation with $18.65 billion, Banker's
Trust (New York) with $17.4 billion, and First Chicago with $17.05 billion. Foreign deposits
account for the additional deposits. As one would expect, a detailed comparison of the Federal
Reserve call data and the Business Week data from SEC Form 10-K reports reveals that foreign
deposits bunch more heavily among the largest United States commercial banks. Most of these
increased deposits occurred among the top 10 banks ($140 billion), and to a lesser extent within
the 11-50 range ($36 billion).
Deposits, United States Banks
December 31, 1977








Total for United States banks
Data
Percent (billions)
18.2 $ 311 (+ 140)
8.0 93 (+ 18)
10.1 113 (+ 18)




If we assume, not unreasonably, that no significant increase results for banks smaller than the 200
largest due to foreign deposits, then considerably higher aggregate concentration follows. Thus,
the top 10 would have 27.9%, the top 50, 46.3%, and the 200 largest, 63.5% of United States com-
mercial bank deposits.










Over the last thirty years, the largest 200 banks have increased
their share of deposits from roughly 52% in 1947 to 56.5% at the close
of 1977, with $532 billion in bank deposits.3 ' This change reflected the
rapid growth among the strong regional banks around the country, and
a gradual decline in the predominance of New York City banking.
Nonetheless, Wall Street's leadership is still evident: fifteen New York
City banks are in the top 200 banks (five of the top ten), and these
fifteen banks hold 12.3% of all commercial bank deposits or a total of
$116 billion. Seven banks in other sections of New York hold $16 bil-
lion in deposits or 1.7%. California's eleven "large" banks in the top
200 have on deposit $99 billion or almost 10.4% of all commercial bank
deposits. Other states trailed downward in the holdings of those
"large" banks (defined as the top 200 commercial banks).
32
A skewed size distribution is evident within every state in the
country, with leading banks in the larger urban areas collecting a larger
share of commercial bank deposits. Well-established laws, however,
prevent banks from establishing interstate branch banks or multibank
holding companies.33 For this reason, banking in the United States
(from a national standpoint) is far less centralized34 than in the major
European countries and Canada, where banks are allowed to branch
freely throughout their entire territories. In addition, before 1933
31. See text accompanying note 30 supra; authorities cited note 27 supra.
32. Pennsylvania has 15 large banks in this category, with 3% of United States bank deposits;
10 large banks in Texas have 2.9%; 5 large banks in Illinois have 2.8%; Ohio's 13 large banks have
2.3%; Michigan's 7 large banks, 2%; and Florida's 11 large banks, 1.7%. Federal Reserve call data,
December 31, 1977 (compilation by the authors). See generally Baker, Bank Expansion: Geo-
graphic Barriers, 91 BANKING L.J. 707, 721-24 (1974). During the last generation, the larger re-
gional banks have grown faster than the traditionally leading Wall Street banks. This explains the
overall increase in share of deposits for the 200 largest banks and the relative decline in the New
York share of bank deposits among the top 200. Commercial bank deposit capital has become
more concentrated among the larger institutions, but its geographic distribution has spread more
widely from New York City to other financial centers such as Chicago, Los Angeles, San Fran-
cisco and Texas. Bus. WEEK, Apr. 17, 1978, at 74-84.
33. Multistate branching is largely prohibited by federal and state laws. Section 7(c) of the
McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1976), and § 3(d) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1842(d) (1976), allow multistate branches only if explicitly authorized by the states. Few states
permit this activity, except in the case of the occasional holding companies with federal grandfa-
ther clause protection under 12 U.S.C. § 36(a) (1976). See Barnes, The Fine Edge ofProhibition"
Interstate and Foreign Banking in the United States, 93 BANKING L.J. 911, 912-14 (1976).
34. See generally Kreider, American Banking: Structure, Supervision, and Strengths, 92 BANK-
ING L.J. 437 (1975).
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Americans enjoyed the 15enefit of a long history of relatively easy mar-
ket entry for newly chartered banks, despite heavy casualties from the
Depression and earlier panics.35 Although entry by new banks has
been less important since 1945 (roughly 85% of the new bank offices
were merely branches of established banks),36 the dispersion of bank-
ing capital is greater in the United States than in any other country.
B. Competition
Patterns of bank competition should be viewed on the national,
regional and local levels. One market for larger loans is national in
scope, perhaps even international, and encompasses the larger corpora-
tions and many foreign governments as borrowers. "Megabanks" are
well fitted for this rivalry, although the larger regional banks must be
included, too. This market is highly competitive, with ample partici-
pants in supply and demand. The second level of markets is regional; it
comprises the stronger participants in both lending and borrowing
within major urban and rural areas. These markets are often less com-
petitive, depending on their degree of concentration, growth rates and
new entry potential. The third level of markets is localized and by far
the most numerous. It consists of metropolitan areas, smaller cities,
and rural districts. Generally, these markets are highly concentrated
except in some of the larger, more rapidly growing urban areas.37
Competitive rivalry within these latter markets does vary somewhat ac-
cording to the number of banking firms (or "looseness" of the oligop-
oly) and the encouragement of new entry from local and regulatory
35. Convenient sources for banking history are J. GALBRAITH, MONEY: WHENCE IT CAME,
WHERE IT WENT (1975); G. FISCHER, AMERICAN BANKING STRUCTURE (1968); M. FRIEDMAN &
A. SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960 (1963); H. ROCKOFF,
THE FREE BANKING ERA: A RE-EXAMINATION (1975); Brown, The DualBanking System, in COM-
PENDIUM, supra note 6, at 239.
36. Between 1945 and 1975, the number of banking offices increased from 17,849 to 44,427,
and the number of branches increased from 4,721 to 29,795. In the same period, net growth in the
number of banks was from 14,126 to 14,632. Fischer & Golembe, supra note 8, table 1. New
entrants into banking totaled 4,406 between 1945 and 1974, but this increase was largely offset by
the loss of 3,044 banks that were acquired and converted into branches, together with 584 other
departures through merger or consolidation. (Tabulation by the authors based on Federal Re-
serve bulletins from 1945 to 1975.) Only 167 banks failed in the period from 1945 to 1975. Gil-
bert, Branch Banking and Safeqy and Soundness in Commercial Banks, in COMPENDIUM, supra
note 6, at 83, 85.
37. See Heggestad & Mingo, he Competitive Condition of U.S. Banking Markets and the
Impact of StructuralReform, 32 J. FINANCE 649 (1977). The Supreme Court took judicial notice
of these circumstances in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 632.
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authorities. The presence of active competition, therefore, at the re-
gional and local levels of banking markets will depend upon new char-
ters, authority for additional branches and the degree of looseness in
oligopoly structures.38
The potential for expansion in banking depends on the growth of
population, income and business expansion in a market area, together
with allowed multiple office banking. Scale economies can be signifi-
cant in this rivalry for growth.39 The existence of many smaller, thriv-
ing banks indicates that good management and imaginative marketing
are not dependent on size, although up to a certain volume of deposits,
larger size does bring advantages in recruiting and sustaining a good
banking organization. On the other hand, many smaller, unprogressive
rural banks survive only with limited competition. And yet, part of the
inherent advantage of rural banks is their specialized knowledge of lo-
cal business opportunities and credit risks.
The sad, though not surprising, fact of state bank legislation is that
choice of regulation for branching seems to be dominated by a struggle
38. For useful studies of competition, structure and performance in the banking industry, see
D. ALHADEF, supra note 27; Alhadef & Alhadef, Bank Entry and Bank Concentration, 20 ANrI-
TRUST BULL. 471 (1975); Benston, The OptimalBanking Structure: Theory and Evidence, 3 J. BANK
RESEARCH 220 (1973); Edwards, The Banking Competition Controversy, 3 NATL BANKING REV. 1
(1965); Edwards, Concentration in Banking and Its Effect on Business Loan Rates, 46 REv. ECON.
& STATISTICS 294 (1964); Edwards & Edwards, Measuring the Effectiveness ofRegulatiom The Case
ofBank Entry Regulation, 17 J.L. & ECON. 445 (1974); Gilbert & Longbrake, supra note 6, at 475;
Greenbaum & All, Entry, Control and the Market for Bank Charters, 29 J. FINANCE 527 (1974);
Guttentag, Branch Banking: A Summary of the Issues and The Evidence, in COMPENDIUM, supra
note 6, at 99; Heggestad, Market Structure, Risk and Profitability in Commercial Banking, 32 J.
FINANCE 1207 (1977); Heggestad & Mingo, supra note 37; McCall & Petersen, The Impact of De
Novo Commercial Bank Entry, 32 J. FINANCE 1587 (1977); Meyer, Price Discrimination, Regional
Loan Rates, and the Structure of the Banking Industry, 22 J. FINANCE 37 (1967); Mote, The Peren-
nial Issue: Branch Banking, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 437; Peltzman, Entry in Commercial
Banking, 8 J.L. & ECON. 11 (1965); Phillips, Competition, Confusion, and CommercialBanking, 19
J. FINANCE 32 (1964); Shull, Multiple Office Banking and Competition A Review of the Literature,
in COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 113; S. Rhoades, Structure-Performance Studies in Banking: A
Summary and Evaluation (Dec. 1977) (Federal Reserve Board staff study); S. Talley, Recent
Trends in Local Banking Market Structure (May 1977) (Federal Reserve Board staff study). See
also G. FISCHER, supra note 35; R. Lanzillotti, BANKING STRUCTURE IN MICHIGAN, 1945-63
(1966); Heggestad & Rhoades, Multi-Market Interdependence and Local Market Competition in
Banking, REv. ECON. & STATISTICS (forthcoming).
39. Scale economies in banking and related financial markets are generally considered to be
significant, although the decline in average costs seems to be much more modest in the larger size
range of banking organizations. See, eg., D. ALHADEF, supra note 27; G. FIsCHER, supra note 35;
L. GRAMLEY, A STUDY OF SCALE ECONOMIES IN BANKING (1962); Ali & Greenbaum, At Spatial
Model of the Banking Industry, 32 J. FINANCE 1283 (1977); Daniel, Longbrake & Murphy, The
Effect of Technology on Bank Economies of Scalefor Demand Deposits, 28 J. FINANCE 131 (1973);
Ryan & Donaker, How GoodIs Branch Bank Pev/ormance?, BANKER'S MAGAZINE, Autumn 1975,
at 102. Some analysts have found that average costs level off at a certain plateau of bank organi-
zation size (for example, $100-300 million in assets or deposits). See generally L. GRAMLEY,
supra, at 18.
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between two special interests. The big city banks want maximum
growth potential; the rural banks want to be protected and enjoy local
dominance. Lost in the shuffle is the public interest. If either group
wins, competition is likely to suffer. The largest banks seek maximum
statewide expansion and market shares, and ultimately would limit ri-
valry among themselves. The smaller, rural banks naturally wish to
confine the larger banks in their state to the big cities and exploit the
advantages of extremely high concentration in rural banking markets
without serious interference.
From an ideal viewpoint, the best regulatory regime for banking
would be one in which the existing loose oligopolies are challenged by
new rivalry or by penetration of markets by nearby banking organiza-
tions.40 This requires freedom from special interest dominance, which
unfortunately seems rare in state capitals.41 State authorities acting
under pressure from opposing factions of bankers are likely to endorse
either (1) excessive local protectionism and highly restrictive branching
and holding company laws, or (2) excessive freedom for the larger
banks to dominate their respective state markets. Neglected is the
"ideal" market structure that is needed to serve the public interest;
competitive or loose oligopolies must be refreshed by penetration of
markets through new charters, branching, and toe-hold merger activity.
Entry barriers into local markets should be reduced. This would
allow more newly chartered banks and de novo branches from banks
outside each area to enter the market, and greater competitive rivalry
would follow. Modest market extension or toe-hold mergers can also
strengthen this process. But there should be a limitation upon sizable
market extension mergers for the larger statewide multibank net-
works.42 Larger market extension mergers significantly increase state-
40. But see Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Swzthesis, 87 YAE L.J. 1
(1977).
41. The regulation of financial institutions at the state level is determined by constituency
politics, with little influence from the general public. Key elements in the equation are the distri-
bution of banks among the districts of state legislators and the relative strength of rural and big
city banks in these districts.
42. S.72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) ("A Bill to amend the Bank Holding Company Act and
the Bank Merger Act to restrict the activities in which registered bank holding companies may
engage and to control the acquisitions of banks by bank holding companies and other banks.")
would amend the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to prevent approval of a proposed merger when
upon consummation of the transaction the bank would "hold more than 20 per centum of the total
assets held by all banks located in the State in which such bank is located." .d § 101; see Baker,
Does Antitrust Law Preclude the Needfor Geographic Constraints on Banking?, 93 BANING LJ.
1005, 1016-17 (1976) (arguing that Bank Merger Act and Bank Holding Company Act be
amended along lines proposed in S.72).
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wide concentration and ultimately could end the prospect of inter-pen-
etration by linking most of the sizable banks into a relatively few, com-
prehensive banking networks. Three goals consistent with scale
economies and efficiency should animate this policy: (1) maximum de-
centralization; (2) maximum competitive rivalry; and (3) healthy stabil-
ity for banking operations to protect against externalities such as
excessive new entry and insolvencies. This blend of goals is feasible
from an administrative standpoint, but involves controversy. The
problems in implementation are mainly political and reflect the ab-
sence of a clear mandate by the general public, as well as economists
and lawyers.
C Regulatory Developments Opportunities For Bank Expansion
Until the Great Depression, American law encouraged new char-
ters and entry into banking. 43 This encouragement was a result of ri-
valry between state regulators, who tended to be more liberal in
granting charters, and national regulators.44 The massive failures of
the 1930's, however, ended this era of encouragement for new entry.
The Banking Act of 1933 was a product of widespread bank failures
during the Depression.4 The Act, among other things, prohibited the
payment of interest on demand deposits and sought to separate the
functions of commercial banking and investment banking.46 Senator
Glass and others attempted to correct the bank failure problem by pro-
viding for greater branching opportunities, which in turn would lead to
the placement of stronger, more diversified banks in local areas.47 Af-
ter extended debate, an alternative proposal for the insurance of banks
was approved. 4 The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
was the result of that debate, and its presence in the Banking Act of
1933 guaranteed the interrelationship of federal and state regulatory
agencies.49 Solvency regulations were strengthened greatly, and FDIC
insurance requirements brought a more protective attitude toward
43. As a result of bank failures during the Depression, structural reform was undertaken in a
number of states to change from unit to branch banking. white, supra note 7, at 52-53.
44. See, e.g., G. FISCHER, supra note 35, at 174-237. See also authorities cited note 35 Supra.
45. See, eg., G. FISCHER, supra note 35, at 198-99; M. FRIEDMAN & A. ScHwARTz, supra
note 35, at 421-22; J. GhABRAHI, supra note 35, at 110-11.
46. See M. FRIEDmAN & A. ScHwARiz, supra note 35, at 434-42; J. GALBRATH, supra note
35, at 195-96.
47. Fischer & Golembe, supra note 8, at 33.
48. Id. at 29-34.




After World War II, interest in bank expansion resumed with the
overall expansion of the economy.51 Branching activity, however, was
regulated by the McFadden Act principle: national banks must con-
form to the restrictions of state law.52 Within these state law limits,
more banks tended to be established in the suburbs and other districts
with significant population or business growth.
Because it took many years for bankers to recover from the trauma
of the Great Depression, development of new multiple office banking
programs was slow in coming.53 So, for a period, bank holding compa-
nies were not used as a device for expansion of banking networks.
54
Nonetheless, the Roosevelt administration sought controls over this
loophole for multibank integration.55 It was not until after the Celler-
Kefauver Act of 195056 raised public consciousness about concentra-
tion, however, that Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956.57 This 1956 legislation was directed against the dangers of ex-
cessive concentration and merger activity in the banking industry. The
Act required Federal Reserve Board approval for bank holding compa-
nies owning more than a single bank.58 The standard for review gave
broad discretion to the Board, with emphasis on the following tradi-
tional banking factors: (1) financial history and conditions of the bank;
(2) earning prospects; (3) management characteristics; (4) convenience,
needs and welfare of the area concerned; and (5) competitive aspects of
the acquisition.59 Diversification into nonbank activities was severely
restricted. The Act did not apply to one-bank holding companies.60
50. See, e.g., G. FISCHER, supra note 35, at 208-09; J. GALBR.ATH, supra note 35, at 197.
51. See Chase, supra note 17, at 1231-33.
52. White, supra note 7, at 50. See also Gup, A .Review of Stale Laws on Branch Banking, 88
BANKING L.J. 675 (1971); Mortimer, Techniques of Statewide Expansion, 93 BANKING L.J. 5
(1976); Vestner, Trends and Developments in State Regulation of Banks, 90 BANKING L.J. 464
(1973).
53. See generally White, supra note 7, at 49 table 1.
54. In fact, bank holding companies decreased in number and size during the 1930's. Id. at
55.
55. Id. at 56.
56. Ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1976)).
57. Ch. 240,70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1848 (1976)). For legisla-
tive history, see S. REp. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1956] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2482.
58. Ch. 240, § 3(a), 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a) (1976)).
59. See id. § 13(c).




Meanwhile, bank mergers were becoming popular." The most
common form of merger was horizontal, that is, a merger between two
competitors within a given metropolitan or urban area. The Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 was inspired by alarm at the increasing
bank industry concentration. A more significant regulation, however,
was section 7 of the Clayton Act, which proscribes any mergers "where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition ... ."I The
banking industry sought to alleviate this constraint in the Bank Merger
Act of 1960.63 Initially, it was believed that the Bank Merger Act
standards of "public convenience" and "interests of the community"
could be used to offset competitive factors and thereby justify more
bank merger activity.'
In 1963, however, the Supreme Court in United States v. Philadel-
phia National Bank 65 held for the first time that Clayton Act standards
applied to commercial banks.6 6 The Court struck down a merger of the
second and third largest banks in the Philadelphia metropolitan area,67
with a combined total of 36% of that community's banking assets and
deposits, 68 holding that such a combination would tend to substantially
lessen competition in that section of the country.69 The Court rejected
the argument that the Bank Merger Act would immunize bank mergers
from antitrust challenge.70 The Court held that repeal of the antitrust
laws by implication is strongly disfavored,7 1 and that because banking
is a highly regulated industry, the play of competition is made not less,
61. See generally Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act andthe Merging ofLaw and Economics, 74
HARv. L. REv. 226, 228-33 (1960).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Alarm at increasing industry concentration was also responsible
for passage of the Clayton Act. Bok, supra note 61, at 233-38.
63. Pub. L. No. 86-463, 74 Stat. 129 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (1976)). For legislative
history, see H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 1995.
64. J. WHITE, supra note 49, at 566-68.
65. 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
66. Compare the treatment of legislative history in the majority opinion, id. at 335-55, and
Justice Harlan's dissent, !:. at 374-86 (dissenting opinion), with the legislative history in H.R. REP.
No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1995.
67. 374 U.S. at 323-24, 330.
68. Id. at 331.
69. Id. at 365.
70. Id. at 350.
71. Id. at 350-51.
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but more, important.72 The majority rejected Justice Harlan's interpre-
tation of the legislative history73 and made it clear that horizontal
mergers would generally be unlawful, except possibly when a bank fail-
ure was threatened. 74
It appears that Congress disagreed in part with the Court. As a
result of the Philadelphia National Bank decision, the Bank Merger
Act75 and the Bank Holding Company Act76 were amended in 1966 by
including a "convenience and needs" defense uniquely applicable to
commercial banks.77 Congress accepted antitrust jurisdiction over
bank mergers, but insisted upon the application of a special standard
for evaluating bank mergers that would take into account prospective
benefits as well as possible anticompetitive consequences. The new law
required collaboration by the Comptroller General, the Federal Re-
serve Board, and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in
reviewing bank mergers, and allowed the Justice Department to chal-
lenge those bank mergers it determined to be in violation of the Bank
Merger Act.78 In subsequent horizontal bank merger cases, the Court
has held that (1) the burden of pleading the "convenience and needs"
defense is on the banks,79 (2) the "failing company" doctrine is to be
strictly applied, 0 and (3) the percentage determination of market share
will continue to be the primary analytical tool even in a proposed
merger of two small banks.8'
72. Id. at 372.
73. Compare id. at 375-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting), with id. at 352.
74. The Court noted that a bank failure defense might have a greater impact on the legality
of a merger than a business failure would have, but did not decide what defenses in § 7 actions
would be allowed to avert unsound banking conditions. Id. at 371-72 & 371 n.46. But cf United
States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 187-88 & 187 n.21 (1968) ("business necessity" not
enough to qualify for "failing company" defense; possibility of eventual failure required).
75. Pub. L. No. 89-356, 80 Stat. 7 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1976)).
76. Pub. L. No. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236 (1966) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1976)).
77. J. WHITE, supra note 49, at 565-66.
78. See id. at 566.
79. United States v. First City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967).
80. United States v. Third Nat'1 Bank, 390 U.S. 171, 187-88 & 187 n.21 (1968).
81. Even mergers of banks in small urban areas were prevented under this policy. See, eg.,
United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (1970). Justice Harlan, dis-
senting, pointed out that if these two banks merged, the resulting bank (measured by trust assets)
would have ranked 1323 out of approximately 3100 banks with trust powers in the United States,
only 23 places ahead of the Phillipsburg National Bank alone. Id. at 374 (dissenting opinion).
For commentary, see Shull & Horvitz, The Bank MergerAct of1960:,4 Decade After, 16 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 859 (1971); Reid, "The Bank Merger Act of.1960: 4 Decade Afier" Comment, 18
ANTITRUST BULL. 449 (1973); Horvitz & Shull, The Bank Merger Act a Decade After: Reply to
Reid, 19 ANTITRUST BULL. 321 (1974); Velk, An Estimate of the Federal Reserve Board of Gover-
nor's Policy Rule in Merger and Holding Company Cases, 1966-1970, 21 ANTITRUST BULL. 537
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2. Bank Holding Companies
The presumptive rule of illegality in horizontal bank merger cases
limited bank expansion to other alternatives such as conglomerate di-
versification into nonbanking markets. 2 Not surprisingly, more large
banks soon decided to exploit this opportunity. 3 They transformed
themselves into one-bank holding companies. The presence of rising
costs and tight money, a pro-expansion attitude by the Comptroller, the
desire for expansion, continued prohibitions on branching, and anti-
trust developments in banking set the stage for the proliferation of one-
bank holding companies under the one-bank loophole in the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956.84
Furthermore, the 1966 amendments to the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act apparently created so much uncertainty about the future of
the bank holding company format that major conglomerates desirous
of acquiring a bank decided to take swift action before any Congres-
sional change.85 There had been slow growth in the number of bank
holding companies between 1957 and the end of 1968,86 but in the pe-
riod from 1969 to 1971 the number of bank holding companies in-
creased greatly. At least 1470 bank holding companies were created in
this latter period, and most of them were one-bank holding companies
incorporated for diversification purposes.87
Congress soon became alarmed by the prospect that major banks
and industrial corporations might integrate,88 and in 1970 the Bank
(1976); Wu & Connell, Merger Myopia: An Economic View of Supreme Court Decisions on Bank
Mergers, 59 VA. L. Rv. 860 (1973).
82. Expansion by bank holding companies into nonbank activities through the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1976), will only be raised briefly in this article. The jury
is still out on the wisdom of bank expansion into nonbank activities. See, e.g., Baker, supra note
24; Blaine, Opportunities and Limitationsfor Expanding into Bank Holding Companies, 90 BANK-
ING L.J. 290 (1973); Darnell, The Bank Holding Company Movement: Panacea, Placebo, or Prob-
lem Child, 2 OHIo N.U.L. REv. 466 (1975); Greenspan, Bank Holding Companies: Competition,
Capital, and Nonbanking Acquisitions, 90 BANKING L.L 560 (1973); Keeffe & Head, What Is
Wrong with the American Banking System and What to Do About It, 36 MD. L. REv. 788 (1977);
Kreider, supra note 34; Rose & Fraser, Bank Holding Company Diverspication into Mortgage Bank-
ing and Finance Companies, 91 BANKING LJ. 976 (1974).
83. Chase, supra note 17, at 1233-36.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1234.
86. From 1957 to 1968 the number of bank holding companies increased from 50 to 80.
(Compilation by the authors based on Federal Reserve bulletins from 1957 to 1968.)
87. Id.
88. In 1956 Congress considered the potential problem posed by the one-bank holding com-
pany, but "came to the conclusion that there was no substantial evidence of abuses in this type of
organization." Chase, supra note 17, at 1232. "As long as any given enterprise owned only one
bank, it could not expand its banking activities structurally beyond the boundaries of any state."
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Holding Company Act was amended to close the one-bank holding
company loophole.89 Instead, Congress allowed one bank and mul-
tibank holding companies greater flexibility to diversify into nonbank-
ing markets "closely related to banking." 90 Although the majority of
large banks had organized themselves into the holding company for-
mat, the gains expected from conglomerate diversification into related
financial markets proved much less attractive than they had seemed in
the late 1960's.91 Many of these related markets are more competitive
than commercial banking, and the rates of return for such investments
have not been particularly impressive. Bank holding company
diversification is now considerably more selective.92
3. Market Extension Mergers
One remaining outlet for significant merger activity and related
expansion by larger banks was the acquisition of banks in other sec-
tions of their respective states, the so-called geographic market exten-
sion merger.93 In Marine Bancorporation, and subsequently in Citizens
& Southern National Bank, the Supreme Court made it clear that the
geographic market extension merger would not be subject to the pre-
sumptive rule of illegality applied in horizontal merger cases.94 In the
The fear at this "time was that holding company cartels might become regional or national giants
in the financial world by acquiring banks in different states." Id.
89. Bank Holding Company Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (codi-
fied at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(a)-(d), 1842-1843, 1849(b)-(c) (1976)); see Rhoades, Changes in the Struc-
ture ofBank Holding Companies Since 1970, MAGAZINE BANK AD., Oct. 1976, at 64, 65.
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1976); see Shay, Bank Holding Companies and the Fed- Whose
Board?, 91 BANKING L.J. 332-33 (1974).
91. E.g., Blaine, Bank Holding Companies in a Year of Slowdown, 92 BANKING L.J. 674
(1974); Heggestad, Riskiness ofInvestments in Nonbank 4ctivities by Bank Holding Companies, 27
J. EcoN. & Bus. 219 (1975); Rose & Fraser, The Impact of Bank Holding CompanyAcquisitions on
Bank Performance, BANKER'S MAGAZINE, Spring 1973, at 85; Ware, Performance ofBanks Ac-
quired by Multi-Bank Holding Companies in Ohio, ECON. REV., FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, CLEVE-
LAND, Mar.-Apr. 1973, at 19. See also Mueller, The Effects ofConglomerate Mergers:A.4 Survey of
the Empirical Evidence, 1 J. BANKING & FINANCE 315 (1977).
92. This is evident from review of recent Federal Reserve Board rulings on bank holding
company diversification, which, despite continued growth in the overall number of bank holding
companies, are now sought less frequently than in the early 1970's. (Compilation by the authors
based on Federal Reserve Board press releases from the relevant period.)
93. A geographic market extension merger involves a merger between two firms with the
same product lines in separate geographic markets. See generally Baker, supra note 42, at 1011-13
(discussing failure of Justice Department efforts to apply potential competition doctrine success-
fully against market extension mergers); Brodley, supra note 40, at 19-25 (discussing other defeats
for potential competition doctrine); Williams, New Dimensions to Bank Merger Law, the Supreme
Court in the Mid-Seventies, 20 ANTITRUST BULL. 699 (1975).
94. See notes 65-81 and accompanying text supra. Extensive commentary has been devoted
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former case, one of the two leading banks in Washington, Seattle's Na-
tional Bank of Commerce (NBC), sought to extend its network of 107
branch offices by merging with Washington Trust Bank (WTB). WTB,
with its office headquarters in the extreme eastern part of the state, had
seven branch offices and was a major factor in the Spokane market.95
NBC, which was owned by Marine Bancorporation, had its principal
office in the Northwest corner of the state and operated fifty-nine
branches in the greater Seattle area together with forty-eight branches
elsewhere in the state. NBC was the second largest banking organiza-
tion headquartered in Washington in terms of assets, deposits and
loans; it had assets of $1.8 billion, deposits of $1.6 billion, and 20% of
the commercial bank deposits statewide. The target bank, WTB, was
the eighth largest banking organization with headquarters in Washing-
ton and the ninth largest in the state; it had assets of $112 million and
$95.6 million in deposits. WTB was the third largest bank in Spokane,
with 18.6% of local bank deposits and 1.5% of all commercial bank
deposits in the state. 6
The challenge to this merger was based upon the potential compe-
tition doctrine of section 7 of the Clayton Act.97 The Government ar-
gued that there would be a reduction in potential competition in
banking because NBC would otherwise be forced to enter the Spokane
market through de novo branch banking or foothold acquisitions. The
Supreme Court refused, however, to find a sufficient loss of potential
competition in Spokane from this merger. The Court found that these
banks were not direct competitors to any significant extent. Thus, the
majority reasoned that the Government had failed to give full weight to
the extensive federal and state regulatory barriers that made it unlikely
that NBC could enter the commercial banking market in Spokane
through a de novo branch bank or a foothold acquisition.98 A foothold
acquisition was considered impractical in Spokane because the smaller,
to these decisions. See, e.g., Alcorn, Merger Analysisfor Banks and Others-Marine Bancorpora-
tion and Connecticut National Bank, 12 Hous. L. Rv. 539 (1975); Horsley, Marine Bancorpora-
tion, Connecticut National Bank and Potential Competitioa 4 Critique, 55 B.U.L. REV. 3 (1975).
See also United States v. Connecticut Nat'1 Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974), which involved a proposed
consolidation of two banking organizations in Connecticut, with 6.2% and 4.1% of statewide de-
posits. The case became moot when the parties abandoned the merger after remand from the
Supreme Court.
95. 418 U.S. at 607.
96. Id. at 60608.
97. Id. at 605.
98. Id. at 627-28, 633.
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independent banks available for acquisition were too small to be attrac-
tive for future growth.99 Finally, the majority refused to consider the
Government's contention that the entire state was the appropriate "sec-
tion of the country" for purposes of measuring the effect on competi-
tion under section 7.1°° The Court held that statewide bank
concentration was not a relevant factor.
The majority apparently was not concerned about concentration in
banking markets. The Court stated:
[I]t is hardly surprising that the Spokane commercial banking market
is structurally concentrated. As the Government's expert witness
conceded, all banking markets in the country are likely to be concen-
trated. This is so because as a country we have made the policy judg-
ment to restrict entry into commercial banking in order to promote
bank safety."
Thus, government regulation was seen as the main reason for bank
market concentration. Finally, the majority gave notice to merger part-
ners that they could offer evidence of conduct and performance to jus-
tify similar bank consolidations.1
0 2
In his dissent, Justice White emphasized the watershed character
of this decision. Justice White contended that the majority was redefin-
ing the potential competition doctrine and dramatically increasing the
government's burden of proof under section 7.1°3 Justice White argued
that the reduction in potential competition by this merger was sufficient
to violate section 7. He also noted that concentration in the banking
industry poses a danger to virtually all costs in our credit economy.c 4
In United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,05 the
Supreme Court held that Citizens & Southern National Bank (C&S)
did not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act" 6 by founding new de
facto branches through a program of sponsorship and that the pro-
posed acquisition by C&S of the stock in these banks did not violate
section 7 of the Clayton Act. 107 C&S was the largest of three leading
99. Id. at 637-38.
100. Id. at 620.
101. Id. at 632 (footnote omitted) (emphasis by Court).
102. Id. at 631.
103. Id. at 642 (dissenting opinion).
104. Id. at 653. For a discussion of the companion case, United States v. Connecticut Nat'l
Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974), see note 94 supra.
105. 422 U.S. 86 (1975).
106. Id. at 120.
107. Id. at 121. Interestingly, the technique of sponsorship-acquisition was urged upon the
Court by the Government in the Marine Bancorporation case as a means for NBC to circumvent
rigid state laws. 418 U.S. at 633-35; f United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. at 144
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banks in the Atlanta metropolitan area. To evade stringent restrictions
against branching into the suburbs, C&S worked out a program of de
facto branch arrangements with six "correspondent" banks. This de
facto program included ownership of stock by friendly parties (with 5%
owned directly by a C&S holding company), use of C&S advertising
and services and close oversight by C&S management. When Georgia
changed its law to allow branching of this type, C&S sought to merge
the de facto branch offices directly into its operations. 108 The Antitrust
Division brought suit to enjoin the mergers under section 7 of the Clay-
ton Act and to challenge the existing de facto branch arrangements
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's rejection of both challenges.
The Court appears to have gone out of its way to endorse multiof-
fice banking measures of this type by approving the use of de facto
branching by other banks throughout the country.10 9 Justice Brennan,
in his dissent, emphasized the danger of allowing expansion by a large
bank into a new market via merger when it already has a substantial
share of the highly concentrated Atlanta market.110
Two areas of dispute between the Court's new antitrust majority
and the dissenters are (1) whether market extension via branching and
mergers by large banks can be procompetitive, and (2) under what cir-
cumstances antitrust limitations would be desirable. The new majority
grants broad leeway for the larger banks to expand by means of market
extension mergers or branching. The minority urges that antitrust en-
forcement should be allowed to limit this expansion by larger banks.
In other words, the minority maintains that de facto branching or mar-
ket extension mergers should be scrutinized more carefully and that the
use of these devices by larger banks to obtain foothold acquisitions in
new markets should be restricted.
Consideration of factors such as entry barriers in determining the
legality of market extension mergers, as in Marine Bancorporation, has
been criticized,"1I and the presumptive rule applied in horizontal merg-
ers, as in Philadelphia National Bank, has been applauded.Y2 Certainly
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (Court did not resolve issue of sponsorship raised in Marine
Bancorporation).
108. 422 U.S. at 90-91.
109. Id. at 118-19.
110. Id. at 130-31 (dissenting opinion).
111. Eg, Brodley, supra note 40, at 26-30.
112. Posner, Antitnst Policy and the Supreme Court: An.4nalysis of the Restricted Distribution,
HorizontalMerger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 282 (1975). Professor
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the extent of entry barriers helps resolve the impact of mergers upon
potential competition and is therefore relevant to section 7 proceedings
in any industry. But using local entry barriers as ajustfcation for large
market extensions seems to be contrary to the spirit of Philadelphia Na-
tional Bank.
The Marine Bancorporation and Citizen's & Southern National
Bank cases raise serious questions about the effectiveness of the Clay-
ton Act and the Bank Merger Act to curb bank expansion in market
extension mergers." 3 This presents an awkward problem for the Fed-
eral Reserve Board staff in screening bank holding company mergers.
4. Multibank Holding Company Growth
The impact of the Marine Bancorporation and Citizens & Southern
National Bank decisions upon efforts to regulate excessive bank expan-
sion can be understood by an examination of subsequent Federal Re-
serve Board approvals for multibank holding company mergers. A
larger range of holding company expansion is now encouraged for the
banking industry. At least 253 mergers involving established bank or-
ganizations have been approved since the Marine Bancorporation deci-
sion on June 26, 1974.114 These transactions have occurred mainly in
states with restrictive branching laws, where the need to circumvent
branching limitations naturally required use of the holding company
format. This increase in mergers reinforces a trend already reported in
a 1974 study conducted by Professor Talley." 5 In his study, Talley
showed the impact of multibank holding companies in a considerable
number of states where significant increases in statewide concentration
were observed from 1968 to 1973. A comprehensive tabulation of Fed-
eral Reserve Board approvals from January 1, 1974 to July 30, 1978,
indicates that this trend is continuing.
Talley calculated concentration ratios for the five largest banking
Posner declares that Philadelphia National Bank "represents the high point of rationality in the
Court's merger decisions." Id. at 307. His conclusion is based upon the requirement that judicial
rules meet two conditions: (1) the rule must have a coherent theoretical basis, and (2) it must be
reasonably precise and objective in the sense of limiting discretion. Professor Posner btlieves that
the rule of illegality set forth in Philadelphia National Bank meets both conditions. Id Contra,
Wu & Connell, supra note 81.
113. See, e.g., Brodley, supra note 40, at 19-20 (discussion of lower court and Federal Trade
Commission potential-competition decisions applying standards of Marine Bancorporation).
114. Tabulation of Federal Reserve Board approvals between June 26, 1974 and July 31, 1978.
(Tabulation by the authors based on Federal Reserve Board press releases from the relevant
period.)
115. Talley, The Impact of Holding Company Acquisitions on Aggregate Concentration in
Banking, in COMPENDIUM, supra note 6, at 377, 395-96.
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organizations in every state for the years 1968-1973. Thirteen states
experienced a significant increase in the share of their five largest banks
traceable to growth of multibank holding companies.' 6 For the pe-
riod, January 1974 to July 1978, these thirteen states saw continued
bank holding company expansion." 7 These additional mergers led to
further increases in concentration in all thirteen states. In addition, sig-
nificant numbers of multibank holding company acquisitions were ap-
proved in other states during the last four and one-half years.1 8 In
fact, almost every state with restrictive branching laws that allows mul-
tibank holding companies has experienced significant bank merger ac-
tivity leading toward increased concentration.
In most of the seventeen states where statewide branching has
been allowed for many years, bank industry concentration is already
established at relatively high levels.' ' Therefore, it appears that a sus-
tained opportunity for statewide branching tends to be strongly corre-
lated with high concentration in a state's banking industry. The new
encouragement for multibank holding companies and their growth by
market extension mergers adds substantially to the roster of states
where relatively high concentration in banking may be expected over a
number of years.
Thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia presently allow
multiple office expansion on a statewide basis. Eighteen of these states
allow statewide branching directly, and nineteen allow multiple office
expansion through multibank holding companies.'20 A minority of
116. Id. at 393-94. They were Florida, 14.8%; Alabama, 14.6%; New Mexico, 11.9%; Wyo-
ming, 10.6%; Missouri, 10.5%; New Jersey, 8.8%; Colorado, 7.7%; Texas, 4.5%; Ohio, 4.6%; Michi-
gan, 4.3%; Wisconsin, 3.7%; Tennessee, 3.6%; and Iowa, 3.1%. All of these states allowed
multibank holding companies, but restricted branching.
117. From January 1974 to July 31, 1978, the Federal Reserve Board approved the following
numbers of merger transactions by multibank holding companies in these states: Florida, 46; Ala-
bama, 18; New Mexico, 1; Wyoming, 4; Missouri, 45; Colorado, 7; Ohio, 20; Texas, 65; Michigan,
22; Wisconsin, 6; Tennessee, 12; and Iowa, 14. (Tabulation by the authors based on Federal Re-
serve Board press releases from the relevant period.)
118. Ten such transactions were approved for Georgia, 3 for Minnesota, 8 for Massachusetts,
3 for Connecticut, 2 for New Hampshire, 1 for Montana, and 4 for Utah. (Tabulation by the
authors based on Federal Reserve Board press releases from the relevant period.)
119. Talley, supra note 115, at 398-99.
120. Eighteen states and the District of Columbia have statewide branching laws. See
ALASKA STAT. § 06.05.399 (1978); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 6-190 (1974); CAL. FIN. CODE § 500 (West
1968); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-59 (West 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5,
§ 770 (1975); D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-103 (1973); HAw. REV. STAT. § 403-53 to -56 (1976 & Supp.
1977); IDAHO CODE § 26-1001 (1972); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 9-B, § 331-339 (Supp. 1978); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 11, § 65 (1957); NEv. Rav. STAT. § 660.015 (1973); N.Y. BANKING LAW §§ 14, 29, 105
(McKinney 1971 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-62 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977);
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 714.030-.060 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 19-1-13 (1968); S.C. CODE §§ 34-1-70, -
3-60, -3-400 (1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 51-20-1 to -5 (Supp. 1978); Vr. STAT. ANN. tit.
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thirteen states have restrictive branching laws that constrain multioffice
expansion.
1 21
Therefore, the great majority of United States Senators (72) and
Congressmen (322) represent states where multiple office expansion is
legal. This fact, coupled with strong pressure for multibank integration
from the larger banks, explains the fundamental change in our banking
structure. Unit banking interests, with their efforts for restrictive
branching laws, have lost their struggle for protection from competi-
tion. Thus, resistance by the small country or unit banks can no longer
be relied upon to promote effectively decentralization in banking or to
contain the trend toward concentration. In any calculus of special in-
terest politics, the big bank forces would seem to enjoy a comfortable
margin of support in the Congress for their programs of expansion.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A fundamental issue in banking policy is the extent to which mul-
tioffice bank expansion should be permitted. Generally speaking, anti-
trust scholars have considered three possible standards for judging
bank expansion-structural analysis, performance and conduct. 122 A
8, § 651 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 30.04.010-.050 (1961 & Supp.
1978). Except for Nevada, Vermont and Washington, these states also allow bank holding
companies.
Nineteen other states allow bank holding companies. See ALA. CODE tit. 5, §§ 5-9-1 to -43
(1975); CoLo. REV. STAT. §§ 11-4-101 to -110 (1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 661.01-.09 (Harrison
1966 & Cure. Supp. 1977); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 524.1801-.1807 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 167A, §§ 1-7 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1977); MicH. STAT. ANN.
§§ 23.710(130), (150) (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); MINN. ANN. STAT. § 49.33-.46 (West 1970 & Cum.
Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 369.910-.940 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODE
ANN. § 5-508.1 (Cum. Supp. 1977); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 384-B:3 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 17:9A-344 to -354 (West 1963 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 48-13-1 to -13
(1953); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1121.03-.06 (Page 1968); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-721 to -723
(Cum. Supp. 1978); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 342-912 (Vernon Cure. Supp. 1977); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 7-6-3 (1953); VA. CODE §§ 6.1-381 to -388 (Cum. Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 221.56 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); Wyo. STAT. §§ 13-9-201 to -205 (1977).
121. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 67-360 (Cum. Supp. 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-203 (Cum.
Supp. 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 16 1/2, § 106 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 28-1-17-1 (1971); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 9-1111 (1975); Ky. REV. STAT. § 287.180 (Cum. Supp.
1978); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-54 (1950); MISS. CODE ANN. § 81-7-7 (1972); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 8-157 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6-03-14 (1975), § 41-04-10 (1968); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 6, § 501 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 904 (1967); W. VA. CODE
§ 31A-8-12 (1975).
122. Brodley, supra note 40. Professor Brodley reviews the previous literature, which includes
proposals by the following antitrust scholars: (1) Turner (prohibit substantial acquisitions in high-
ly concentrated markets by most likely potential entrants), id. at 58; (2) Pitofsky (refinement of
Turner approach, which focuses on incentives to enter market), id. at 60; (3) Neal Report (White
House Task Force) (bar acquisitions of leading firms in concentrated markets by any "large
firms"), id. at 64 & n.252; (4) Steiner (use market proximity in proposing rebuttable presumption
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structural approach to antitrust analysis, along the lines set forth in the
Philadelphia National Bank decision, offers the most viable policy to
restrict excessive bank expansion. In terms of achieving the relevant
goals of (1) optimal decentralization of banking, (2) strong competitive
rivalry, and (3) healthy stability, the preferable market structure would
be comprised of loose oligopolies enlivened by new entrants or inter-
penetration of markets from nearby banking organizations.
A policy of selective limitations on multioffice bank expansion is
most likely to encourage competition and a decentralized banking in-
dustry, while still affording an opportunity for scale economies. 123 By
preventing the larger multibank networks within each state from
achieving excessive size, we tend to foster looser oligopolies, and this in
turn fosters more rivalry and interpenetration. 124 The banking industry
will be more diffuse in its ownership patterns, less inclined to oligarchic
narrowness and more friendly to diverse economic development. And
yet by allowing considerable branching and multibank integration, the
of illegality for market extension), id. at 68; and (5) Brodley's own approach, in which he con-
cludes that a structural analysis is the only effective tool. Professor Brodley proposes use of a
presumption of illegality if (1) the acquiring firm is the "most significant entrant," (2) the target
market is highly concentrated, and (3) the target firm has a market share of at least 5%. Cf. S.72,
95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) (§ 101 would prevent approval of proposed bank merger if, as result,
bank would hold more than 20% of total bank assets in state); Mote, supra note 36, at 47 (suggests
restricting number of branches a bank might have within given area, but not restricting areas
within which banks might establish branches).
123. Other choices that could be considered are (1) stringent limitations on multioffice bank
expansion within states, (2) unlimited multioffice bank expansion within state boundaries, and (3)
interstate multioffice bank expansion. Each of these choices can be briefly evaluated in terms of
relevant public policy goals and the ideal regulatory scheme.
(I) A policy of stringent limitations on multioffice bank expansion within states is most
favorable to unit banks. A parochial unit banking policy would protect concentrated oligopoly
and even monopoly markets; furthermore, this policy is no longer politically feasible in view of
the large number of states that allow multiple office banking by means of statewide branching or
bank holding companies. See note 120 supra.
(2) A policy of unlimited multioffice expansion within state boundaries is most favorable to
the larger banks. Although such a policy would permit scale economies, the costs to society from
excessive concentration are great. Economic history in modem times offers many illustrations of
the dangers of concentrated economic power in financial markets.
(3) A policy of interstate multioffice bank expansion has been suggested by a few commen-
tators, but this proposal does not command the necessary political support for adoption. The idea
that we would completely abandon our national tradition of decentralized banking and permit
such a drastic structural transformation is unrealistic. For example, the top 50 banks already hold
47% of commercial bank deposits in this country, the potential for such megabanks to branch
nationwide would be anathema to our social policy.
124. For example, a maximum limitation on growth (in terms of assets or deposits within a
particular state or relevant market) of 20% would allow a maximum of five banks to control the
market. Competition might be better assured, however, if this oligopoly market were looser. A
15% limitation on size would require at least six firms to compete within a single market, and, as a
practical matter, the lesser ranking firms would have smaller market shares trailing downward.
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organizational and other economies associated with large scale bank
networks can be accommodated for most purposes.
The most sensible limitations on multibank integration from this
perspective are two-fold: (1) an absolute ceiling on the statewide mar-
ket share achievable by market extension merger transactions, and (2)
the prevention of larger market extension mergers by multibank hold-
ing companies of considerable size.
In most states there should be a limitation of 15% on the statewide
share of commercial bank deposits resulting from any market extension
merger. Existing bank organizations with somewhat larger percentages
could be allowed to continue. We should not, however, permit expan-
sion as high as the market share of the present leaders, which is often
above 25%. Even 20% may be too high.'25 In twenty-eight states the
leading bank organizations already have 15% or more of commercial
bank deposits. 126 In other words, only de novo branching activity
125. See, e.g., S.72, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
126. In appreciating the impact of this guideline, it is helpful to review the statewide market
shares of leading banks in the various states and the District of Columbia. The states fall into
three categories: (1) high concentration (70% or more of market held by five largest bank organiza-
tions); (2) moderate concentration (45%-66% of market held by five largest bank organizations);
and (3) low concentration (41% or less of market held by five largest bank organizations).
Market Shares of Five Leading Banks Within Each State
High Concentration States % Market Share % Total
Alaska 32, 21, 13, 8, 8 82
Ariz. 42, 28, 15, 5, 3 93
Cal. 37, 12, 11, 9, 7 77
Del. 36, 22, 18, 13, 3 92
D.C. 33, 24, 13, 11, 8 89
Hawaii 38, 33, 9, 7, 5 92
Idaho 36, 27, 12, 9, 4 88
Me. 18, 15, 14, 12, 12 71
Nev. 50, 20, 12, 9, 5 96
Ore. 36, 34, 6, 4, 3 83
R.I. 39, 25, 23, 4, 3 94
Utah 29, 19, 13, 8, 5 74
Wash. 33, 19, 8, 8, 7 75
Moderate Concentration States % Market Share % Total
Ala. 15, 11, 11, 11, 5 53
Colo. 16, 15, 10, 8, 7 56
Conn. 20, 18, 9, 9, 6 62
Md. 19, 14, 11, 9, 8 61
Mass. 22, 13, 12, 8, 8 63
Mich. 15, 11, 9, 8, 3 46
Minn. 26, 22, 3, 2, 2 55
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should be allowed for these forty-seven odd leading banks in twenty-
eight states. The purpose of establishing ceilings in terms of statewide
market share is to prevent high concentration, not authorize it.
The primary effect of this limitation upon market extension merg-
ers would fall upon the leading twenty-six banks in the high concentra-
tion states, and upon the twenty-one leading banks in states with

































































Table compiled by authors from Federal Reserve Board call data, December 31, 1977.
In the high concentration states there were 17 banks with market shares of 25% or more, 20
banks with 20% or more, and 26 banks with 15% or more. In the moderate concentration states
there were 2 banks with market shares of 25% or more, 8 banks with 20% or more, and 21 banks
with 15% or more. And in the low concentration states there were no banks with as much as 15%
of the market share.
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grow by establishing new branch offices or by chartering new bank sub-
sidiaries for their holding companies. Finally, these leading banks
could continue to grow by attracting more commercial, industrial and
wealthy depositors in their respective areas. Thus, strictly speaking, the
leading bank organizations would not be prevented from expansion-it
is only that market extension mergers would be disallowed as an exces-
sively rapid, needless and anticompetitive method of growth in the
market place.
The second limitation on multibank integration should also be
achieved through merger policy. The larger market extension mergers
by multibank holding companies within each state should be pre-
vented.127 While toe-hold acquisitions or de novo branches are nor-
mally healthy, procompetitive and desirable, acquisitions by bank
organizations that already enjoy statewide market shares in excess of
20% should be unlawful. What is needed is a limitation on market ex-
tension mergers by the larger bank organizations within each state.
But, at the same time, more new entrants, additional de novo branch-
ing by established banks, and toe-hold market extension mergers
should be encouraged. In other words, the Federal Reserve Board and
the Justice Department should construe quite narrowly the loophole for
larger market extension mergers created by Marine Bancorporation. As
an isolated event, the merger of Washington's second largest bank
(with 20% of deposits statewide) and Spokane's third largest (with 18%
of deposits locally) may not be important, but if seriously exploited as
the governing precedent in the coming years, the policy of Marine
Bancorporation could seriously limit merger supervision and enforce-
ment with respect to market extension by banks.
127. The Antitrust Division has supported such a policy for years. See Baker, supra note 42,
at 1011-13. See also Brodley, supra note 40, at 80-81 (urging stringent rule on market extension
mergers); Schweitzer & Green, Greeley in Perspective: at Really Happens When,4 Bank Holding
Company Expands into a LocalMarket?, 95 BANKING L.J. 143 (1978) (demonstrating procompeti-
tive impact of toe-hold market extension mergers in reducing concentration for Colorado banking
markets); Solomon, ifank Merger Policy and Problems.4 Linkage Theory of Oligopoly, 89 BANK-
ING L.J. 116 (1972).
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